

Contents

Summary	iii
Kurzfassung	vii
1 Introduction	1
2 The logic of relative frustration: Boudon's competition model and experimental evidence	7
2.1 Introduction	8
2.2 Boudon's competition model and hypotheses	10
2.2.1 The model	10
2.2.2 Model implications and hypotheses	13
2.3 Experimental methods	17
2.4 Relative frustration in the lab	19
2.4.1 Test of hypotheses	19
2.4.2 Beyond the loser rate: Gini coefficient	21
2.5 Discussion and conclusion	23
2.A Appendix	26
2.A.1 Central statistical analyses	26
2.A.2 Instructions	27
2.A.3 Additional information on the model	31
2.A.4 Additional information on the experimental procedures and design	33
2.A.5 Additional statistical analyses	35
3 Are luxury brand labels and 'green' labels costly signals of social status?	45
3.1 Introduction	46
3.1.1 Conspicuous consumption as a signal of social status . .	46

3.1.2	Public generosity and pro-environmental behavior as signals of status and prosociality	46
3.1.3	The present study	48
3.2	Experiment 1	49
3.2.1	Materials and method	49
3.2.2	Results	50
3.3	Experiment 2	51
3.3.1	Materials and method	51
3.3.2	Results	52
3.4	Experiment 3	53
3.4.1	Materials and method	53
3.4.2	Results	54
3.5	Experiment 4	55
3.5.1	Materials and method	55
3.5.2	Results	56
3.6	Experiment 5	57
3.6.1	Materials and method	58
3.6.2	Results	58
3.7	Discussion and conclusion	58
3.A	Appendix	62
3.A.1	Shirts and caps used as experimental treatments	62
3.A.2	Regression estimates for experiments 2-5	63
3.A.3	Regression estimates with respect to sex for experiments 1-5	67
4	An international field experiment of norm enforcement in anonymous interactions: How costs and benefits impact altruistic punishment	73
4.1	Introduction	74
4.2	Theoretical background	75
4.3	Experimental design and evidence	79
4.4	Discussion and conclusion	90
4.A	Appendix	93
4.A.1	Additional tables	93
4.A.2	Additional figures	97
5	The sanctioning dilemma: A quasi-experiment on social norm enforcement on the train	99
5.1	Introduction	100
5.2	Theory and hypotheses	102

5.2.1	Diffusion of responsibility in the symmetric volunteer's dilemma	102
5.2.2	Tacit coordination in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma	104
5.2.3	Decreasing benefits in the volunteer's timing dilemma	105
5.2.4	Norm salience	106
5.3	Materials and methods	106
5.3.1	Procedures and design	106
5.3.2	Data	109
5.4	Results	110
5.5	Discussion and conclusion	114
5.A	Appendix	117
6	Eye spots do not increase altruism in children	119
6.1	Introduction	121
6.2	Experimental methods	124
6.3	Results	127
6.4	Discussion and conclusion	133
6.A	Appendix	136
6.A.1	Experimental methods	136
6.A.2	Data analysis	137
7	Summary and conclusion	143
	References	151
	Acknowledgments	171
	Curriculum vitae	173